Abstract. Existing literature usually considers earnings manipulation to be a negative social phenomenon. We argue that earnings manipulation can be a part of the equilibrium relationships between …rms' insiders and outsiders. We consider an optimal contract between an entrepreneur and an investor where the entrepreneur is subject to a double moral hazard problem (one being the choice of production e¤ort and the other being intertemporal substitution, which consists of transferring cash ‡ows between periods). Investment and production e¤ort may be below socially optimal levels because the entrepreneur cannot entirely capture the results of his e¤ort. The opportunity to manipulate earnings protects the entrepreneur against the risk of a low payo¤ when the results of production are low. Ex-ante, this provides an incentive for the entrepreneur to increase his level of e¤ort and invest e¢ ciently.
1 Introduction.
The recent wave of corporate scandals (Worldcom, Enron, Nortel etc.) has raised heated debates regarding the manipulation of earnings by …rms' insiders. Existing literature usually considers earnings manipulation (hereafter EM) to be a negative social phenomenon and suggests measures for its elimination. In the present paper, we argue that earnings manipulation can be a part of the equilibrium relationships between …rms'insiders and outsiders.
In contrast to earnings being misreported, which in most cases represents accounting fraud, 1 we consider EM to be a transfer of funds between periods. This transfer does not create any social value (in contrast to productive e¤ort). Some typical examples include delaying the approval of important decisions, ine¢ cient investments, borrowing in order to manipulate …nancial results, ine¢ cient discount policy etc. 2 EM is well documented in empirical literature. For instance, Degeorge, Patel, and Zeckhauser (1999) discovered discontinuities in the distribution of corporate earnings at some speci…c values (thresholds). The number of reports with earnings just below the threshold is much lower than those just above the threshold. This suggests that insiders are involved in earnings manipulation around the threshold level. Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) show that 30-44% of …rms with small premanaged losses manage earnings to create a positive pro…t. Recently, Yu, Du, and Sun (2004) examined earnings management by Chinese …rms and found earnings manipulation around two thresholds.
Degeorge, Patel, and Zeckhauser (1999) also present a theoretical model involving EM by a manager with a bonus-like contract. The authors show that the manager's incentive to manipulate earnings depends on the values of the latent (pre-managed) earnings, the manager's bonus, and the magnitude of the social loss from EM. The manager's decision also relies on whether pre-dictions of future pro…ts are certain or risky. In contrast, the model in the present paper contains a double-moral hazard problem (one being the choice of production e¤ort and the other being the EM decision). We compare different contractual arrangements between an investor and an entrepreneur as well as their impact on the entrepreneur's e¤ort. This is important given that several recent papers analyze the links between …nancing structures and EM (see, for instance, Richardson, Tuna and Wu (2007), Hodgson and Stevenson (2000) and Jensen (2002) We analyze a model where a …rm needs external …nancing. The …rm's value consists of current (…rst-period) earnings and the going concern value. In contrast to current earnings, it is costly to verify the going concern value of the …rm and enforce payments contingent on it (for instance, since it is impossible to describe all states of nature in the future and all optimal actions, the …rm's owners may be able to divert all future earnings to their own pockets). 3 The fact that it is impossible to write a complete contract contingent on the …rm's going concern value eliminates any opportunity to write a contract contingent on the …rm's total value (which would eliminate the problem of EM because EM cannot increase the …rm's total value). The …nancing contract includes cash payments and an allocation of rights on the …rm's going concern value -both being contingent on the magnitude of the …rm's current earnings. 4 The contract may optimize the value of the parties cooperation because of the impact it has on the entrepreneur's incentives to provide productive e¤ort and engage in EM. For instance, if the going concern value represents a new …rm and the party responsible for decision-making is the sole owner of this new …rm, this party will be interested in shifting the value of the original business to the new …rm (even if it is socially ine¢ cient).
As mentioned above, we compare two situations. In the …rst, the entrepreneur chooses only a costly productive e¤ort -assuming that the entrepreneur cannot be involved in EM. In the second, the entrepreneur is subject to a double-moral hazard problem which includes the choice of productive e¤ort and the EM decision. It is shown that the entrepreneur's productive e¤ort may be higher in the second case. The following demonstrates the intuitions behind this result. Consider debt …nancing. If current earnings are below the face value of debt, the …rm is bankrupt and the entrepreneur gets nothing. If the amount of investment is relatively high, the debt face value should also be high. When the face value of debt is higher than the maximal value of current earnings, the entrepreneur receives nothing regardless of the e¤ort provided. However, if he is able to transfer earnings between periods and the …rm's going concern value is relatively high, the entrepreneur can increase current earnings by reducing the …rm's going concern value. This allows the …rm to avoid bankruptcy and make a positive pro…t. This in turn increases his ex-ante incentive to provide productive e¤ort. This argument works even if the cost of intertemporal substitution is relatively high.
Note that recent scandals have caused many authors to believe that linear contracts are the best contracts for managers (entrepreneurs) because they protect the …rm against EM (see, for instance, Jensen, 2003) . The main problem is that such contracts are not optimal if the entrepreneur is subject to moral hazard with regard to the choice of productive e¤ort (Innes, 1990 ). However, Jensen (2003) argues that the bene…ts from non-linear contracts cannot be compared to the disadvantages of EM. This paper argues that nonlinear contracts, including standard debt, can be better than linear contracts.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the model; Section 3 explains optimal contracting without EM; Section 4 discusses optimal contracting when the entrepreneur is subject to a double moral hazard problem which includes EM. A comparison of the outcomes is presented in Section 5. Section 6 discusses the model's implications with regard to empirical evidence and Section 7 presents the conclusions.
Model.
Consider a …rm that has to make an investment b > 0. The …rm's owner/entrepreneur (E) needs external …nancing from an outside investor (I). E and I are risk neutral. If the investment is made, the …rm's performance depends on E's e¤ort e 2 [0; 1]. The cost of e¤ort is e 2 . The interim …rst-period cash ‡ow r 0 equals 1 with probability e and 0 otherwise. The company's assets which remain at the end of …rst period may yield the revenue 2 in the second period.
5 E may engage in EM. The …rm's …nal …rst-period pro…t is r = r 0 a, where a is a pro…t correction arising from intertemporal substitution (EM takes place if a 6 = 0). From an outsiders perspective, r is observable but r 0 , e, and a are unobservable. If a 6 = 0, the …rm's going concern value at the end of …rst period is v = 2 + a c, where c is the cost of EM, 0 < c < 2.
6
EM is socially ine¢ cient (a = 0, where a denotes the socially optimal a). To insure that earnings are non-negative in each period we assume c 2 a r 0
The …rst-best level of e¤ort e maximizes the …rm's expected value (which includes …rst and second-period earnings minus the cost of e¤ort and investment). It is assumed for simplicity that the risk-free interest rate is zero and there is no discounting. Thus, the expected value can be written as
Obviously, e = 1=2. We assume that the project's net present value is positive, i. e.
A complete contract contingent on the …rm's going concern value is impossible to write. This stems from the idea that it is much more di¢ cult to describe (ex-ante) all scenarios for long-term investments compared to shortterm ones. Therefore, E is not able to o¤er I a complete contract contingent on the …rm's total value. As we discuss in Section 5, if this were possible, the problem of EM would not exist. Thus, we assume that E can only o¤er a complete contract contingent on …rst-period earnings r, and that E (the party in control) can capture the …rm's going concern value (similar to Hart, 1988 ). E remains in control when the …rm does not default. This leads to the following security design in the model which depends on the …rst-period sharing rule and the contingencies for shifting control in the second period. 7 Equity …nancing (denote this strategy by s). In this case, I gets a fraction k of the …rm's earnings in the …rst period, 0 < k 1. V E = (1 k)r + v and V I = kr, where V E and V I denote the payo¤s of E and I respectively.
Debt (denote this strategy by d). The …rm issues debt with face value D which matures at t = 1. If r < D (default), I gets the …rst-period earnings that the going-concern value of the …rm is large enough compared to current earnings. 6 The cost of EM includes mostly the time E spends on creating the "technology" for EM (like creating a special purpose vehicle (…rm) to hide losses in the case of Enron). This is not necessarily linked to the magnitude of EM. The model can be generalized by allowing di¤erent cost functions. 7 In Section 5 we discuss di¤erent security designs.
and the …rm's going concern value. E gets nothing. If r D, E's …rst-period earnings are r D. He also obtains the …rm's going concern value. Therefore,
The game is as follows: 1. Securities are issued and sold for an amount b. The investment is made.
2. E chooses e. 3. r 0 is realized. E observes r 0 and chooses a. 4. r and v become known. The parties get their payo¤s according to the securities issued.
When choosing which securities to issue, E maximizes the expected value of his net earnings (payo¤ on the securities minus the cost of e¤ort). On the one hand, the contracts should provide E with the optimal incentive to choose e and a. On the other hand, the expected value of I's payo¤ must cover the investment cost, b, in order for I to accept the contract.
3 Optimal contracting without earnings manipulation.
Consider an optimal contract when E does not manipulate earnings under any circumstance. This may be the case when the government puts in place a well developed system of corporate control which makes it highly probable that EM will be discovered. If the penalties for manipulating earnings are very high, E cannot justify taking the risk. E's problem can be written as follows (problem P1).
where W E (E's expected pro…t) equals E's expected payo¤ minus the cost of e¤ort: W E = EV E e 2 . To solve P1 we will decompose it into two sub-problems. We …rst consider each …nancing strategy separately and will summarize the results in Proposition 1.
Hence the optimal level of e¤ort is
This is below the …rst-best level of e¤ort: E gets only a fraction of the …rm's pro…t but absorbs all the costs. I's expected payo¤ is
The optimal k maximizes W E under the condition that EV I is not less than b. From (4) we get:
From (5), I's payo¤ is maximized when k = 1=2 which implies that the maximal EV I is 1=8. Thus, strategy s is feasible only if b 1=8. Since E's expected pro…t is decreasing in k (from (6)), the optimal k can be found by equalizing (5) and b which produces (3). End proof.
Intuitively, if b is too large, the fraction of equity that must be given to I is large enough to prevent E from providing an e¤ort level which will generate enough income to compensate I.
The maximand of this expression is e 0 = 3 D 2 . However, since D 1 (otherwise E gets nothing) we have e 0 > 1 which implies e = 1. I's payo¤ is D. Therefore, D = b is optimal. This only works if 1 b. If 1 < b and D 1, I's payo¤ is not su¢ cient to cover the initial investment. If D > 1, E provides no e¤ort since he gets a payo¤ of zero and thus I gets nothing. End proof.
An explanation for Lemma 2 is as follows. If b is larger than the maximal …rst-period earnings, setting the debt face value below that maximal level of earnings is not su¢ cient to ensure that the investor is repaid at least b. If debt face value is higher than the maximal …rst-period earnings, E has nothing to gain and does not provide any e¤ort. Proposition 1. 1) If b 1=8, s is the optimal strategy. 2) If 1=8 < b 1, d is optimal; 3) if 1 < b, the project will not be undertaken.
Proof. From Lemma 1, if s is chosen, b 1=8 and
If d is chosen, b 1 and
Proposition 1 follows from comparing (8) and (9) for di¤erent values of b.
End proof. The project will be undertaken if and only if b < 1. Thus, there is less ine¢ ciency under small values of b than under high values of b. Given that E's portion of total pro…t increases as b decreases, E will provide a greater e¤ort when b is lower. Also, note that Innes (1990) analyzes a similar environment (where an entrepreneur's e¤ort is costly and EM is not allowed) with only one period (in terms of our model this means v = 0) and demonstrates that debt is the best …nancing strategy. 4 Optimal contracting with earnings manipulation.
Now suppose that E can manipulate earnings. E's problem (P2) can be written as follows:
As in the previous section, we begin by considering each …nancing strategy separately. 
2) if s is chosen, k is determined by (3). Proof. Consider strategy s. Given the intermediate pro…t r 0 and action a, E's payo¤ is:
(1 k)r 0 + 2; if a = 0 (11)
Let be the di¤erence between (11) and (12) . We have = c ka. If r 0 = 0, then, from (1), a 0. Thus > 0 and a = 0 is optimal. If r 0 = 1, then, from (1), a 1. (12) is maximized when a = r 0 and it equals 3 c. Also, (11) equals 3 k. Thus, if k < c, a = 0 is optimal. If k > c, the optimal a = r 0 (when the cost of EM is relatively low, E will increase the …rm's going concern value). 8 If strategy s is chosen, I's payo¤ is kr. If k > c, then it follows from the above paragraph that I's payo¤ is 0 (this cannot be an equilibrium outcome). If k < c
E does not manipulate earnings regardless of r 0 . Thus, W E = e(3 k) + (1 e)2 e 2 (i.e. with probability e, r 0 = 1 and E gets (1 k)r 0 + 2 = 3 k and with probability 1 e, r 0 = 0 and E gets 2). W E is maximized when e = (1 k)=2. Analogously to Lemma 1, we …nd that this only works if b 1=8 and the optimal k is given by (3) . From (3) and (13) , this contract only works if the condition (10) holds. End proof.
An explanation of Lemma 3 is as follows. When strategy s is chosen and current earnings are low, E does not manipulate earnings since he receives the …rm's total going concern value and only a part of the …rm's current earnings. If current earnings are high, E can engage in EM (pumping up the …rm's going concern value) if the cost of EM is relatively low. The latter case can be detrimental for I since he does not have control over the …rm's going concern value under strategy s. The condition (10) requires that the cost of EM is relatively high. Thus, if s is chosen, E always chooses a = 0. The payo¤s are the same as those in the case without intertemporal substitution except for the condition (10).
Lemma
The main result of Lemma 4 is that, in contrast to Lemma 2, debt …-nancing is possible even when b is relatively high. Without EM, a high b would lead to a high debt face value which destroys E's incentive to provide productive e¤ort. With the possibility of EM, E can make pro…t even if the debt face value is large and current earnings are low.
To 
This means that if the …rm defaults on its debt, E gets nothing. If the …rm does not default, E gets the …rm's …rst-period pro…t plus the …rm's going-concern value minus the cost of EM. If r 0 D, a = 0 is optimal. The same holds if r 0 < D and 2 + r 0 D c < 0. Otherwise, the optimal a satis…es a r 0 D and 2 + a c 0. If these conditions are satis…ed, E's earnings remain the same regardless of a. Thus, for simplicity, we will assume a = r 0 D. Finally, we have:
If interim earnings are greater than the debt face value, the optimal strategy for E is not to manipulate earnings. The same holds if bankruptcy is unavoidable (debt is too large and current earnings are too low). Otherwise, the optimal intertemporal substitution action is one that makes the …rm's …rst-period earnings just enough to cover the debt.
Three di¤erent situations are possible depending on the magnitude of D. Consider
It will be shown that this case is never possible. The debt face value is less than 2 c and less than the amount of investment b (recall that by assumption b > 2 c) which makes this case counterintuitive. It needs to be proven formally however, since I can get a large portion of the …rm's going concern value if the …rm defaults in the …rst period. By (18)- (20), a = r 0 D, 8r 0 . This means that E will manipulate earnings regardless of r 0 (the condition (20) implies that even if the …rm performs well, the interim earnings are below the debt face value, and (19) ensures that the going-concern value is high enough to allow an increase …rst-period earnings to repay debt even if r 0 = 0). 
This means that, with probability e, E gets current earnings of 0 and the …rm's going concern value 2 reduced by the amount of EM (D 1) and the cost of EM. The maximand of (22) 
This means that debtholders receive D (when r 0 = 1) with probability e 00 and they receive the …rm's going concern value 2 with probability 1 e 00 = ( 1 + D + c)=2 (when r 0 = 0). From (22), W E = (3 D c) 2 =4 which decreases in D. Thus, the optimal D is the minimal one which makes (24) equal to at least b under conditions (21) and (23). Solving this optimization problem we get the following (note that (14) denotes the minimal value of D, which makes (24) equal to b).
An interpretation of Lemma 4 is as follows. If b is relatively low (b < 2 c) and the cost of EM is relatively low (c < 1), debt is risk-free (D = b). The face value of debt is low and E is able to manipulate earnings to attain the threshold to avoid bankruptcy. If b is relatively large (b > 2) and the cost of EM is relatively high (c > 1), debt is not feasible (EM is not possible).
Otherwise, E delivers some reasonable level of e¤ort which implies some positive probability of default making debt risky. Lemmas 3 and 4 lead to the following proposition. by (8) and Lemma 3. If d is chosen, E's payo¤ is (2 c) 2 =4 (see the proof of Lemma 4). The former is not less than 33=16 (this value is attained when b = 1=8) and the latter is not greater than 1=2 (this value is attained when c = 0). Thus, s is optimal. Consider
. Again, the payo¤ from s is higher. To see this, note that the payo¤ from d decreases in c.
, the payo¤ from s is still larger. Thus, it is also larger under other values of c. Consider
c. By Lemma 3, s is not feasible. d is feasible and thus is optimal.
Consider 1=8 < b 2. s is not feasible. d is feasible and thus is optimal. Consider 2 < b. s is not feasible. If c > 1, no contract is feasible. If c 1, d is feasible and thus is optimal. End proof.
Proposition 2 is intuitive. First, if b is large, s is not feasible -as discussed in the case without EM. Thus, debt is the optimal …nancing choice if the cost of EM is low. For other values of b, we have the following. A low c is detrimental to s because it creates opportunities for E to engage in EM, thereby shifting the …rm's value away from I's pockets. d is almost always accompanied by EM, so reducing the cost of EM is bene…cial for debt …nancing.
Corollary 1 considers the e¤ect of changes in b on the optimal choice of contract. It is shown that when c is relatively small, …rms with a high b issue debt while …rms with the same c but a low b issue equity. If b is relatively small, E will …nance the project by issuing stock. The …rm's going concern value will fully cover the investor's investment. The entrepreneur will keep 100% of current period earnings which will mitigate the moral hazard problem. If b is large, then …nancing in this way may not be feasible. Therefore, debt becomes optimal. Corollary 1. If
is optimal if 1=8 < b 2, and no contract is feasible if b > 2.
Proof. Follows directly from Proposition 2. Corollary 2. Earnings manipulation can appear in equilibrium. Earnings manipulation is more probable as c decreases and b increases.
Proof. From Proposition 2, if, for instance, c < 1 and b > 2 c, the equilibrium outcome is …nancing by debt and, if r 0 = 1, the …rm will manipulate earnings. Also, from Proposition 2, for a given b, debt …nancing is optimal when c is relatively low. In most cases, debt …nancing, in contrast to equity …nancing, will be accompanied by earnings manipulation (see the proof of Lemma 4). From Corollary 1, the same holds for high values of b. End proof.
Can earnings manipulation enhance a …rm' s value?
We now compare …rms that are involved in EM (Section 4) with those that are not (Section 3). If the amount of investment is large (b > 1), a …rm that does not manipulate earnings will not undertake projects with positive value. In contrast, a …rm that manipulates earnings will undertake the same projects. If the amount of investment is low and EM is not possible, …nancing with equity is optimal. If a …rm can manipulate earnings, equity may still be optimal. However, for equity to be optimal, the cost of EM must be high -otherwise the entrepreneur will "convert" current earnings into ine¢ cient long-term projects making the issuance of equity unfeasible (ex-ante). In the latter case, debt becomes optimal. This will usually be accompanied by EM: the entrepreneur will try to achieve the threshold to avoid bankruptcy. It follows that there is a trade-o¤ in social e¢ ciency between the bene…ts from EM improving the entrepreneur's e¤ort and the costs of EM. Proposition 3. If 1 < b 2, …rms that manipulate earnings have a higher value than …rms that do not:Otherwise, …rms that manipulate earnings have a higher value if and only if the cost of manipulation is low.
Proof. Let V EM denote the value of …rms that can manipulate earnings and let V N denote the value of …rms that cannot manipulate earnings. As follows from Proposition 1, if b > 1 and earnings manipulation is not allowed, the …rm does not invest and thus V N = 0. According to Proposition 2, if 1 < b 2 or if b > 2 and c < 1, …rms that can engage in EM will use debt …nancing and invest in the project. The value of these …rms will be positive. Consider 1=8 < b 1. According to Proposition 1,
(from the proof of Proposition 2). This expression decreases in c when c 1. The minimal value, 2 b, is attained when c = 1. Therefore, the value of …rms that can engage in EM is greater than or equal to the value of …rms that are not involved in EM. If c > 1,
. This is less than 2 b. Therefore, …rms that do not manipulate earnings have a higher value.
, …rms that manipulate earnings have the same value as …rms that do not. If c
This expression decreases in c. When c = 0, > 0. When c = 1 p 1 8b 2 , < 0. The proposition follows from the continuity of in c. End proof.
6 Model discussion.
1. Suppose that it is possible to write an enforceable contract contingent on the …rm's total value. Then, for any contract found in section 4, there exists an alternative contract contingent on the …rm's total value that will provide E with a higher payo¤. To illustrate this, consider c < 1 and b < 2 c. If a …rm can engage in EM, the optimal contract is analogous to the one described in proposition 2. E's e¤ort is e = 1=2 and the parties expected payo¤s are:
and EV I = b. D = b is optimal. E manipulates earnings regardless of r 0 . When r 0 = 0 he receives 2 b c and when r 0 = 1 he receives 3 b c.
Now suppose the parties write a contract where E gets 2 b if the …rm's total value is 2 or less and 3 b if the …rm's total value is greater than 2.
The optimal e¤ort maximizes e(3 b) + (1 e)(2 b) e 2 . e = 1=2 is optimal. Also, a = 0 because any a > 0 will only reduce the …rm's total value. E's expected payo¤ is 9=4 b which is greater than (25). EV I = 1=2(3 (3 b)) + 1=2(2 (2 b)) = b. Therefore, we have a better contract which does not involve EM.
2. Now suppose that the model does not contain productive e¤ort. In this case, equity is the optimal …nancing contract since it eliminates the intertemporal substitution problem (this idea is developed in Jensen, 2003) . Other securities will be useless. This scenario is not realistic since …rms do not issue equity alone.
3. Suppose that the …rm can issue convertible debt. This is similar to standard debt described in the model except that I can purchase a fraction of the …rm's shares when it is solvent. However, since E remains in control, he will cream-o¤ the …rm's going concern value. Hence, the modelling is similar to standard debt.
4. Long-term debt is not considered (in the spirit of incomplete contract literature) because it cannot be enforced. Since the creditors do not have property rights on the remaining assets, the owners will capture the …rm's entire going-concern value. 5. One can make additional assumptions about the …rst and second period sharing rules based on a continuous earnings distribution function or di¤erent control shifting scenarios. These scenarios may yield some new results. For instance, one can assume that E also has some private bene…ts from controlling the …rm. However, the main idea that EM can improve productive e¤ort will not be a¤ected.
7 Implications.
1. We have shown that EM can be a part of the equilibrium relationship between …rms'insiders and outsiders. This holds even if the cost of EM is relatively high (as follows from Proposition 2). Investors accept some degree of EM because this increases the insiders' incentive to provide a high level productive e¤ort.
2. From Proposition 3, if the cost of EM is relatively low, EM can be socially e¢ cient. EM can enhance a …rm's value when compared to the case without EM. If the cost of EM is relatively high, the opportunity to engage in EM either does not a¤ect …rms' values (when they do not use EM in equilibrium) or is detrimental to …rms'values (when …rms engage in EM in equilibrium).
3. EM should more frequently be observed in industries characterized by incomplete contracts. If complete contracts can be written, the parties can write a contract contingent on the …rm's overall earnings which eliminates the possibility of EM. Thus, …rms in industries which are characterized by a high degree of technological or market uncertainty (such as software, internet, biomedical etc.) are more likely to be engaged in EM.
4. As implied by Corollary 2, EM should more frequently be observed among less pro…table …rms (high b). This prediction is consistent with Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) .
5. Firms which manipulate earnings issue more debt (Lemmas 3 and 4). This is consistent with Richardson, Tuna and Wu (2002) and Hodgson and Stevenson (2000) where …rms which have excessive debt are more likely to be involved in EM.
6. It follows from Corollary 1 that …rms with a higher b (and lower profitability respectively) issue debt more often than …rms with a lower b. This is consistent with a very important corporate …nance phenomenon: the negative correlation between debt and pro…tability (see, among others, Titman and Wessels (1988), and Rajan and Zingales (2000)).
Since EM can be socially e¢ cient, the question of its regulation depends on the industry and any parameters related to the …rm's projects. If the cost of EM is relatively low, putting in place an expensive public system of EM prevention cannot be e¢ cient: entrepreneurs will invest less funds in socially e¢ cient projects and will not provide high levels of productive e¤ort. According to our analysis (proof of Proposition 3), such a system should target average-pro…t …rms (when the cost of EM is relatively high) or high-pro…t …rms (when the cost of EM is in the intermediate range).
Conclusion.
This paper analyzes a model where an entrepreneur needs external …nancing for a pro…table investment project and his productive e¤ort is not observable by outsiders. The security design should provide the entrepreneur with the optimal incentive to provide productive e¤ort. We have a standard moral hazard problem when the entrepreneur is not able to manipulate earnings. The equilibrium level of e¤ort is below the socially optimal level and in some cases (if the amount of investment is relatively large), the entrepreneur will not invest in socially e¢ cient projects. Following this, we analyze the case where the entrepreneur is also able to manipulate earnings. More speci…-cally, the entrepreneur can transfer cash ‡ow between periods. Our main …nding is that the existence of EM can lead to increased output (including the entrepreneur's e¤ort and the amount of investment) and therefore improved social e¢ ciency. It is also shown that EM should more frequently be observed among …rms with low pro…tability, low costs of EM, and extensive debt …nancing. The main policy implication is that putting in place an expensive system to prevent EM may be socially ine¢ cient.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 5. Suppose c < 1. First, consider the choices of a and e. Three situations are possible. Consider 2 c D > 1. By (16) , in this case a = r 0 D, 8r 0 . This implies
and
Thus, e = 1=2 is optimal. 
Now we turn to the analysis of the choice of optimal contract. The case b > 2 c was described in the text.
Consider the case 1 < b < 2 c. For the case 2 c D > 1, by (26), D = b is optimal. From (27)
Consider the case 2 D c < 0
Since W E decreases in D by (30), the optimal D is the minimal one that makes (29) at least equal to b. Taking into account (33) and (28) 
